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ABSTRACT 
With the adoption of the latest German pension reform in spring 2004 a public 
debate arose on whether rates of return for future pensioner cohorts were threatened 
to become negative as a result of the new reform. In order to make the system 
sustainable, the reform had restricted future rises in the contribution rate at the 
expense of further decreases in pension levels. 
The paper contributes to this ongoing discussion by providing (1) a thorough 
discussion on the appropriate measurement of rates of return of the German public 
pension system and (2) projections of the rates of return for future pensioner cohorts 
based on the German public pension system after the 2004 reform. It is found that 
under realistic assumptions of future demographic and labour market developments, 
rates of return will be lower than for present retirees, but remain positive. 
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Rates of Return of the German PAYG System –  
How they can be measured and how they will develop 
By Christina Benita Wilke 
1 Introduction 
In summer 2004, in the aftermath of the latest German pension reform, the chair of 
the Federal Constitutional Court, Hans-Jürgen Papier, made an official statement that 
the constitutional conformity of the German public pension system would be 
threatened should future rates of return become negative for younger cohorts.1 The 
statement referred to the previous public debate that had reflected fears that the 
newly introduced sustainability factor2 would decrease pension levels to such an 
extent that future cohorts will receive benefits that are smaller than their 
contributions. 
This raises two questions. The first one is obvious: How high are future rates of 
return essentially going to be? Calculations based on the new reform measures were 
first made by Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) and then also taken up by the Sozialbeirat 
(2004) in the context of the 2004 pension insurance report of the government and by 
the Sachverständigenrat (2004) in its annual report. They find that future rates of 
return will remain clearly positive. In contrast, Raffelhüschen (2005) as well as 
Ottnad and Wahl (2005) calculate (partly) negative rates of return for younger 
cohorts, based on very different assumptions.3 
The second question is: What is the appropriate calculation method to obtain 
cohort-specific rates of return? The common approach in the German pension 
literature is to calculate rates of return for different demographic groups (single men, 
single women and married couples) and different scenarios (retirement at the 
statutory retirement age, retirement at earlier ages etc.). This so called “scenario-
based approach” was used by all of the above named studies. 
The scenario-based view, however, does not allow to adequately consider all risks 
that are covered by the German pension insurance. Apart from longevity risk 
                                                 
1 Die Welt (2004). 
2 For a description of the factor and its effects see Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held and Wilke (2003). 
3 The studies of Raffelhüschen (2005) and Ottnad and Wahl (2005) will be briefly discussed later on 
where relevant. 
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(covered through old-age pensions) and the risk of survival (covered through 
survivor pensions), this is most notably the invalidity risk4 (covered through 
disability pensions) which is hard to capture within a scenario-based approach.5 In 
order to reflect the whole range of insurance benefits the German pension insurance 
provides it is crucial to account for all risks simultaneously. 
This paper therefore presents a calculation method that is based on a stochastic 
rather than a scenario-based, deterministic approach. It computes the rate of return of 
the expected payment flows (where the expectation includes longevity, survival and 
invalidity risk as well as the time of retirement) rather than the rate of return of a 
specific deterministically defined scenario. It thus allows to consider the whole range 
of possible scenarios simultaneously.6 In particular, the artificial and non-
representative figure of the (modified) standard pensioner7 used for the scenario-
based approach as well as for most official calculations in the German public pension 
system is replaced by a (weighted) average of pensioners in each cohort.8 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the issue 
of rates of return in the context of the German pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. 
Section 3 then looks at alternative calculation concepts and presents both the 
deterministic and the stochastic approach in more detail. Section 4 presents the 
results of the two approaches. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 Papier (1998) emphasizes that potential benefits from invalidity pensions have to be considered in 
the calculation of the rates of return. 
5 In general, the amount of contributions paid into the system is adjusted by a correction factor that 
accounts for the invalidity share of annual pension expenditures. See also section 3.2. 
6 For an older calculation of the rates of return based on a stochastic approach see Schnabel (1998). 
7 The standard pensioner is a fictive person that worked for exactly 45 years, always earned the 
average wage and retires at the statutory retirement age of 65 years, receiving a normal old-age 
pension. See also section 3.2. 
8 Papier (1998) points out that only if future rates of return become negative for the “average” or 
“typical” pensioner would this question the constitutional conformity of the system and the property 
rights on pension claims that are inherent in the German pension system. See also Sozialbeirat (2004). 
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2 Cohort-specific rates of return of the German PAYG 
system 
In the German PAYG system the size of the individual pension is derived from (1) 
the sum of earning points9 at the time of retirement entry EPi,RE that the individual 
accumulated during the working period, (2) the adjustment factor FRE that adjusts the 
pension size according to the time of retirement entry10 or the pension type 
respectively (e.g. widow pension) and (3) the current pension value PVt that annually 
readjusts the value of the pension according to the development of average wages 
and internal system parameters: 
 
tRERE,it,i PVFEPP ××=         (1) 
 
The size of the individual pension is thus linearly linked to the amount of 
contribution payments during the working life. Unlike many other pension systems, 
the German system of old-age pension does not redistribute within cohorts (‘relative 
equivalence’). Differences in the rate of return across individuals of the same cohort 
are therefore only due to differences in life expectancy and the timing of life-time 
contributions. 
A politically very sensitive parameter is the “pension level” defined as the 
monthly pension of a standard pensioner divided by the average monthly wage of an 
insured employee.11 In the past, the German pension insurance recorded comparably 
high pension levels (70% net) that could be maintained until the end of the 1990s but 
were paid by substantial increases in the contribution rate. As a consequence, the 
rates of return of today’s younger pensioner cohorts are lower than those of the 
                                                 
9 The amount of earning points collected in one year is derived from the ratio of the earned wage to 
the average wage of all employed workers of the same year. If the average wage is earned, exactly one 
earning point is acquired. If the wage is only 80% of the average wage, only 0.8 earning points are 
acquired. 
10 Pension benefits are reduced by 0.3% for each month that the individual retires earlier then the 
statutory retirement age 65 and are increased by 0.5% for each month the individual retires later than 
65. 
11 Note that pension levels in Germany do not correspond to the economic notion of a replacement 
rate which relates pension benefits to the wage immediately before retirement. The standard pensioner 
is defined as a person with an earnings history equivalent to 45 years at the average wage and 
retirement at age 65, see also section 3.2. 
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elderly. Due to the rise in labour costs and their potentially negative effect on 
economic growth, the two latest pension reforms of 2001 and 2004 limited future 
increases of the contribution rate while allowing for a reduction in pension levels. 
The resulting past and future development of contribution rates and (gross!)12 
pension levels of the German PAYG system is depicted in Figure 1.13 The rates of 
return of future pensioner cohorts thus will be affected both by rising contribution 
rates during their contribution period and declining pension levels during their 
pension phase. 
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FIGURE 1: DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRIBUTION RATES AND PENSION LEVELS 
(1950 TO 2050) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the MEA-PENSIM model.14 Projected figures are based on the 
demographic and labour market forecasts used by the “Rürup Commission” (Kommission für die 
Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme, 2003). Note that contribution 
rates turn our higher than according to the commission’s report since the proposed but not yet 
implemented increase in the statutory retirement age is not taken into account here. In addition, 
simulations are run from 2005 onwards and thereby already fully incorporate the effects of the 
extremely low growth rates of the past two years. 
                                                 
12 Note that pension levels until recently have been recorded as net pension levels in the German 
official statistics and are only newly recorded as gross pension levels. Since there is no data on the 
development of current pension values before 1960, pension levels are displayed only from 1960 on. 
13 For the rate of return calculations in the subsequent sections data on contribution rates and pension 
levels beyond 2050 is needed. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that the rates remain 
constant after 2050. Long-term projections – based on the underlying demographic and labour market 
assumptions – corroborate this trend. 
14 MEA-PENSIM is a pension simulation program that was developed at the Mannheim Research 
Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA) and served among others as a cross-check for the 
calculations of the “Rürup Commission”. For a description of the program see Wilke (2004). 
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3 Calculation concepts 
This section starts off with the question of how rates of return of the German pension 
system can be measured. Thereafter, two different calculation concepts are 
described: the traditional, deterministic scenario-based approach and an alternative 
stochastic approach. Both concepts will be used for the calculation results presented 
in section 4. 
3.1 How to measure rates of return 
How can the rate of return of the German public pension system for a specific cohort 
be measured? In general, rates of return describe the size of gains or losses on an 
investment. In the context of the German PAYG system, the investment consists of 
the contributions paid to the system (negative payment flow) whereas the benefits 
received during the pension phase (positive payment flow) represent the pay-off of 
the investment. The rate of return can thus be measured as the proportion of the size 
of benefits to the size of contributions. 
The internal rate of return.   Since contribution payments and pension benefits 
occur at different points in time, the flow of positive and negative payments has to be 
discounted to a common date in order to make the different values of the payments 
comparable. In general, this is the starting point of the payment flow, which in this 
case is the date of entry into the labour force.15 The rate of return can then be 
calculated as the so-called internal rate of return, for which the capital value of the 
overall payment flow is zero: 
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 CVc,a0  … Capital value of the payment flow of cohort c at age a0 
 a  … Age index 
 a0  … Age of entrance into the labour force 
 aRE  … Age at retirement entry 
 Ac  … Maximum age/ end of pension period of cohort c 
 Pc,a  … Pension payments to cohort c at age a 
 r  … Internal rate of return 
 Contribc,a … Contribution payments by cohort c at age a 
                                                 
15 For selected questions such as on early retirement incentives, it makes sense to discount the values 
of the payment flow to a point in time that is close to potential retirement, at which the individual can 
be assumed to be confronted with the decision on when exactly to retire. Such calculations can e.g. be 
found in Schnabel (1998). For the rate of return, however, the point in time chosen as t0 is irrelevant as 
it does not change the results. 
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The advantage of this internal rate of return method is that there is no need to 
determine an appropriate discount rate that otherwise had to be specified in advance. 
The results are therefore independent of any reference rate.16 
Gross versus net rates of return.   Due to the gradual transition to deferred taxation 
which will start in 2010 and will be fully completed by 2050, net values loose their 
importance within the German public pension system. The rates of return calculated 
in this paper are therefore based on gross values where tax reductions of pension 
benefits and health and care insurance contributions are not accounted of. However, 
it should be pointed out that this transition to deferred taxation in general will have a 
positive effect on the size of the rates of return. Due to the German tax progression, 
the transition to deferred taxation will mostly lead to a larger tax relief during the 
working life than the additional tax burden it creates during the retirement phase as 
long as retirement income is lower than labour income. The resulting effect on the 
rates of return will therefore be positive, which means that our calculations tend to 
underestimate the true rates of return. 
Nominal versus real rates of return.   Past as well as current calculations of the 
rates of return for the German pension system mostly have been presented in nominal 
terms.17 This is typically justified by the fact that most people are more familiar with 
the concept of nominal rates of return since they know it from the capital market. 
However, nominal rates of return are strongly biased by inflation. In Germany, 
inflation reached extremely high rates in the 1970s which of course deeply affects the 
real value of contribution payments made during this period. Figure 2 shows the 
development of past and future nominal and real average gross wages. If inflation is 
to be controlled for, real rates thus have to be looked at. In the following, nominal 
rates of return are therefore mainly displayed for comparison. 
                                                 
16 Note that in the calculations in this paper, neither the state subsidy to the pension system nor non-
insurance benefits are considered. While they have a different impact on the rate of return for certain 
individuals which makes the following calculations even more complicated (e.g. mothers, and in the 
past low wage earners and the highly educated) the aggregate effect is neutral because the state 
subsidy is meant to exactly cover the non-insurance benefits. Ottnad and Wahl (2005) drop this 
assumption and calculate rates of return for a scenario where an increasing amount of government 
subsidies is used to finance ordinary insurance benefits. As expected, the resulting rates of return turn 
out considerably lower and partly even turn negative. 
17 An exception is Schnabel (1998, 2001) and the Sozialbeirat (2004) that presents both nominal and 
real rates of return. 
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It is important to note that future real gross wages are assumed to continue to 
increase at a rate of 1.5%, which means in its economic essence that annual long-run 
economic growth remains positive.18 Contribution payments to the pension insurance 
(in real terms) thus do not remain constant but rise over a cohort’s life cycle. This 
effect is strengthened even more by the projected increases in the contribution rate 
itself. Due to the compound interest effects in the internal rate of return calculations, 
the earlier, lower contribution payments are weighted higher which has a favourable 
effect on the resulting rates of return. If this effect is neglected and constant 
payments in real values of today are assumed over the entire contribution period, the 
true rate of return is thus underestimated for those cohorts with a contribution history 
in the past. On the other hand, real net wage growth also leads to increases in benefit 
payments over the retirement period and thus has a favourable effect on resulting 
rates of return even though later payments are again considered less. Studies that 
choose a simplified approach based on constant payment flows, such as the one of 
Raffelhüschen for the MDR Umschau (2005) should therefore be interpreted with 
care. 
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FIGURE 2: DEVELOPMENT OF NOMINAL AND REAL WAGE GROWTH (1950 TO 
2050) 
Source: Historical figures are taken from the National Statistical Office (www.destatis.de). The 
projections correspond to the assumptions by the “Rürup Commission” (Kommission für die 
Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme, 2003) and assume a 3% nominal 
annual growth and an inflation rate of 1,5% in the long run. 
                                                 
18 Even though it is unlikely that future real net growth will turn zero, some studies use this 
assumption as a worst case scenario, see e.g. Ottnad and Wahl (2005). 
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As mentioned at the outset of this paper, the annual positive and negative payment 
flows for the internal rate of return calculations can be computed in two 
fundamentally different ways. In the following, the common scenario-based 
approach will be explained first. Thereafter, an alternative stochastic approach will 
be presented. Within both approaches, rates of return will be computed for three 
demographic groups separately (single men, single women and married couples). 
3.2 The deterministic approach 
The deterministic approach takes a scenario-based view. Given a set of assumptions 
regarding the working life, the time of retirement entry and the applicable type(s) of 
pension benefits, the respective contribution and benefit history for a specific cohort 
is calculated (for different demographic groups) and the corresponding internal rates 
of return are determined. Different scenarios allow to look at different sets of 
assumptions. This deterministic approach clearly dominates the German pension 
literature19 and was also used for the most recent calculations on the effects of the 
2004 German pension reform by Ohsmann and Stolz (2004), Sozialbeirat (2004) and 
Sachverständigenrat (2004). 
The Standard Pensioner – Male, single.   The standard scenario is that of the 
standard pensioner. The standard pensioner is a fictive person that starts working at 
age 20, works for 45 years, earns in all years the average wage20 and retires at the 
statutory retirement age of 65 years. Based on this fictive earnings history the 
standard pensioner accumulates 45 earning points. Since he retires at the statutory 
retirement age he is entitled to receive an old-age pension (without any reductions), 
the size of which is determined by the sum of earning points times the current 
pension value of the respective year. 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Eitenmueller, S. (1996) and Eitenmüller, S. and S. Barth (1997), an earlier paper by 
Ohsmann and Stolz (1997) or Hain, W., Gliesmann, H. and E.-J. Horn (1998). 
20 In reality, income usually is lower than the average income of the labour force at the beginning and 
higher than the average wage versus the end of an individual’s working life. This has an effect on the 
resulting rates of return, since the internal rate of return method weighs earlier contribution payments 
higher than later ones. In order to evaluate this effect, an age-specific earning profile was introduced 
that allows for a rise in wages over the working life but equally results in 45 earning points if the 
individual retires at the statutory retirement age. The profile was derived from the medium profile of 
an estimation of sector- and education-specifc wage trajectories by Fitzenberger et al. (2001) for 
Western Germany. The calculations show, that for a typical individual this effect is only marginal and 
thus can be neglected. The same applied for the stochastic approach in section 3.3. 
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Equation 2 can now be written as follows: 
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  Ac  … Now: Remaining life expectancy of cohort c at age 65 
  EPa  … Acquired earning points at age a 
  PVc+a  … Current pension value in year t=c+a 
  AGWc+a  … Average gross wages in year t=c+a 
  τ PSc+a  … Contribution rate to the pension system in year t=c+a 
 
It is assumed that the length of the pension period corresponds to the remaining life 
expectancy at age 65, i.e. if the latter is 20 years, 20 years of pension benefit 
payment flows are considered for the calculation. Of course, this scenario of the 
standard pensioner can also be calculated for women. In this case the only difference 
lies in a higher remaining life expectancy.21 Figure 3 shows the past and projected 
development of the remaining life expectancy for both men and women. 
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FIGURE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF THE REMAINING LIFE EXPECTANCY AT AGE 65 
(1970 TO 2050) 
Source: Historical figures are taken from the National Statistical Office (www.destatis.de), while 
future figures are consistent with the demographic forecast used by the “Rürup Commission” 
(Kommission für die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme, 2003). 
                                                 
21 It could be argued that different earning points should be considered for different demographic 
groups (e.g. less earning points for women than for men). However, since the German pension system 
ensures relative equivalence (see section 2), such intra-cohort effects are not subject of this paper. 
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The Standard Pensioner – Male, married.   In contrast to singles, married couples 
may obtain additional benefits (survivor benefits) by the pension insurance if one 
partner dies and the surviving spouse does not possess considerable personal pension 
income. While this is still relevant for many married men, it so far plays a minor role 
for married women since their husbands mostly have own substantial pension income 
that is deducted from the survivor pension.22 The subsequent calculations therefore 
focus on married men. Typically, it is assumed that the standard pensioner is married 
to a housewife who is 3 years younger than he is. The adjustment factor for the 
survivor pension FS is 60%. For Cohorts after 1961, the factor was shortened to 55%. 
The rate of return r for a married man can thus be derived from equation 3: 
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  ASpouse  … Remaining life expectancy of the spouse 
 
Early retirement.   In the case of early retirement, e.g. at age 63, the retirement age 
aRE in equation 3 is set to 63, the sum of earning points has to be reduced to 43 and 
the annual pension benefit Pc,a is to be reduced by the appropriate adjustment factor 
of 7,2%23: 
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Limits of the deterministic scenario-based approach.   There are several reasons 
why the scenario-based approach is less than satisfactory. First, the use of the 
remaining life expectancy leads two distorting effects: 
1. It is assumed that the standard pensioner for whom the rate of return is 
determined reaches the age of 65 with a probability of 100%. In reality of 
course, some contributors decease earlier. 
                                                 
22 A widow pension for the man incurred for less than 25% of all pensioner couples in 2004 and less 
than 15% of these widow pensions were fully dispensed due to the reduction of existing pension 
income by the husband (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger, 2004). 
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2. It is assumed that the standard pensioner lives exactly according to the 
cohort’s average remaining life expectancy. However, the rate of return for 
the cohort as a whole is not equal to the rate of return for a person of this 
cohort with exactly the average life expectancy due to Jensen’s inequality24: 
the rate of return is a highly nonlinear and concave function of its stochastic 
ingredients such as life length and life-time earnings. The linear 
approximation implicitly applied in the conventional approach therefore 
overestimates the true value of the rate of return. 
Second, in contrast to old-age and survivor pension benefits, benefits from disability 
pensions are difficult to capture in this kind of scenario-based approach since there 
exists no ‘typical’ invalidity scenario. Since contribution payments comprise the 
coverage against invalidity risk which then cannot be reflected in the benefit flow, 
the standard approach in the German pension insurance literature is to include only 
that part of contributions in the calculations that covers old-age and survivor risks. 
On an annual, cross-sectional basis, this is a share of roughly 80%.25 The remaining 
20% are paid for rehabilitation and invalidity expenditures. In the calculations, 
annual contributions are therefore corrected by a correction factor of 80%. However, 
this contribution correction factor suffers from aggregation bias since the cross-
sectional computation of the average budget impact does not represent the true 
longitudinal payment flow for a specific cohort. Moreover, the bias from Jensen’s 
inequality, see above, equally applies since different individuals of a certain cohort 
face different disability risks which do not result in the same rates of return if an 
“average” risk is included in the calculations instead. 
Finally, the scenario-based approach cannot capture the fact that the pension 
insurance insures against all three risks simultaneously. The calculation only captures 
the pay-off for those risks that apply for the chosen scenario, i.e. a typical person 
receiving an old-age pension, a typical disabled person, or a typical beneficiary of a 
survivor pension. 
                                                                                                                                          
23 Theoretically, life expectancy then would also have to be adjusted to the age of 63. Due to data 
restrictions this is typically not done, though, and will not be done here either. 
24 According to Jensen’s inequality, the expected value E(x) of a non-linear function g() of a random 
variable x is not equal to the non-linear function of the expected value of this variable: 
E(g(x)) ≠ g(E(x). For a concave function g(), E(g(x)) < g(E(x)). See also Appendix A. 
25 See Schneider (1997) for a discussion on the appropriate size of this ratio. 
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3.3 A stochastic approach 
The stochastic approach therefore considers the whole range of possible scenarios 
simultaneously instead of only looking at one particular case at a time. Every 
possible scenario is weighted with its probability to occur. The range of possible 
scenarios results from the combination of the four possible events that partly already 
have been considered for the chosen scenarios within the deterministic approach: (1) 
alive and working, (2) alive and receiving an old-age pension, (3) alive and receiving 
a disability pension and in the case of married couples (4) death but spouse is alive, 
receiving a widow pension. In this section we will describe how rates of return are 
calculated under such a stochastic approach and how this approach differs from the 
deterministic approach presented above. 
Looking at expected cohort-specific payment flows.   The deterministic payment 
flow is turned into a stochastic payment flow by including the probabilities with 
which each possible event i might occur. It comprises the expected values of the net 
payments for each age a of the life cycle of a cohort c.26 Four cases are distinguished 
at any age a: an individual may be working with a certain probability, thereby paying 
contributions to the system (i=1); the individual may be disabled with a certain 
probability, thereby receiving a disability pension (i=2); the individual may be 
retired, thereby receiving an old-age pension (i=3); finally, the spouse of the 
individual may receive a widow pension (i=4) if the individual is dead and the 
spouse still alive. The four cases are illustrated in Box 1. 
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BOX 1: THE STOCHASTIC APPORACH IN A NUTSHELL 
                                                 
26 Note that the rate of return calculated on the basis of the expected payment flow for a certain cohort 
is not the same as the expected cohort-specific rate of return. See Appendix B. Appendix B also 
explains why this approach was chosen instead of computing cohort-specific expected rates of return. 
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Note that in the stochastic approach there is no fixed retirement age aRE like in the 
deterministic approach. Instead, contribution payments as well as pension benefits 
are now recorded for all years although certain event probabilities may be zero.27 
The calculation of pension benefits under this approach has to account for path 
dependencies since the size of the applicable pension in a specific year depends on 
the age at which the individual became disabled or retired. The calculations of the 
cohort-specific payment flows will therefore be derived step by step as further 
extensions to the deterministic approach presented above. 
Step 1: Introducing probabilities of survival.   Under the scenario-based approach, 
the individual was assumed to reach each age before its assumed end of life with the 
probability of 1. Now it is assumed that the individual survives each year only with a 
certain probability Sc(a|a=a0)<1. The survival rate Sc(a|a=20) determines the 
probability for a member of the cohort c to reach age a given that it reached the 
conditional age a=20. This probability is age- and cohort-specific. Figure 4 depicts 
its development over the life cycle for both men and women and shows how the 
curve is further shifting outward for younger cohorts as these are projected to live 
longer. 
Accounting for this probability of survival, the formula for the internal rate of return 
for a single man (or woman) who retires at the statutory retirement age and has not 
become disabled during his (her) working life can be extended as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) 0
1
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1
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00 64
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,0
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,0 =


+×=−


+×=
−
=
−
=
∑∑ aa
a
acc
aaA
a
acc r
ContribaaS
r
PaaS
c
RE
  (6) 
Ac … Now: Maximum possible age that can be achieved by cohort c 
 
with P and Contrib as defined in section 3.2. In the case of married couples, the 
different respective survival probabilities of the husband and his (younger) wife are 
used. 
                                                 
27 The calculations in this paper ignore the relatively rare events of retiring before age 54 or after age 
71. Hence, it is assumed that the probability to receive a pension becomes positive at age 54 (namely 
in the form of disability pensions) while the probability to pay contributions turns zero after age 70. A 
is the maximum age that can be achieved which is assumed to be 100. These boundaries are derived 
from the underlying empirical data, see Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003). The assumed time of entry 
into the labour force a0 is age 20. 
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FIGURE 4: CONDITIONAL SURVIVAL RATES FOR MEN AND WOMEN (COHORTS 
1940 AND 1990) 
Source: Historical figures are taken from the National Statistical Office (www.destatis.de), while 
future figures are consistent with the demographic forecast used by the “Rürup Commission” 
(Kommission für die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme, 2003). 
 
Step 2: Introducing probabilities of disability.   Next, the invalidity risk will be 
introduced. Until recently, eligibility regulations for disability pensions were rather 
weak in Germany and thus often used as an easy early retirement option. This was 
changed in the context of the 2001 pension reform where these eligibility regulations 
were tightened considerably. Another major change was implemented with the 1992 
and 1999 pension reforms which introduced adjustment factors for early retirement 
and increased the eligibility ages for most pension types.28 Figure 5 on the next page 
depicts the phase-in of these regulations across affected cohorts for women, the 
disabled and the longtime insured29. 
                                                 
28 For an overview of the reform process of the German pension system during the past three decades, 
see Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004). 
29 Longtime insured are those with a contribution history of at least 35 years. 
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FIGURE 5: RETIREMENT AGE WITH AND WITHOUT ADJUSTMENTS (1992 AND 1999 REFORMS) 
Source: Based on information provided by the Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte (BfA) 
(www.bfa.de). 
 
As a result of these reform measures, probabilities of retirement due to disability 
differ not only by age but also across cohorts, depending on whether cohorts are 
already affected by the reform or not. They are displayed in Table 1 on the following 
page. Cohorts before 1940 are assumed to enter into disability retirement with the 
same probability as the 1940 cohort. The same applies to all cohorts after 1944 with 
respect to the 1944 cohort. It is assumed that, once a disability pension is received 
there is no return to the labour force. 
Accounting for the probability of invalidity and subsequent disability benefits in 
addition to the probability of survival changes the internal rate of return equation 
stated in equation 6 as follows: 
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(7) 
 
  ( )Disabp ac,  … Probability of cohort c to be disabled at age a 
  OldAge
acP +  … Old-age pension of cohort c at age a 
  Disab
acP +  … Disability pension of cohort c at age a  
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Cohort 
Age 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Men 
54 0,0214 0,0196 0,0178 0,0160 0,0141 
55 0,0200 0,0176 0,0153 0,0129 0,0105 
56 0,0230 0,0197 0,0164 0,0131 0,0097 
57 0,0264 0,0224 0,0183 0,0143 0,0103 
58 0,0262 0,0215 0,0169 0,0123 0,0077 
59 0,0267 0,0215 0,0163 0,0111 0,0059 
60 0,3152 0,2799 0,2446 0,2093 0,1739 
61 0,0797 0,0885 0,0974 0,1062 0,1151 
62 0,0602 0,0572 0,0543 0,0513 0,0484 
Women 
 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
54 0,0176 0,0163 0,0151 0,0138 0,0125 
55 0,0179 0,0163 0,0147 0,0131 0,0115 
56 0,0192 0,0175 0,0159 0,0143 0,0126 
57 0,0172 0,0155 0,0137 0,0120 0,0102 
58 0,0186 0,0158 0,0129 0,0101 0,0073 
59 0,0171 0,0150 0,0130 0,0110 0,0089 
60 0 0,3806 0,3628 0,3450 0,3272 
61 0 0 0,0795 0,0850 0,0915 
62 0 0 0 0,0306 0,0304 
TABLE 1: PROBABILITIES OF RETIREMENT ENTRY DUE TO DISABILITY 
(COHORTS 1940 TO 1944) 
Source: Probabilities for the 1940 cohort (that was not affected by the reform) and for the 1944 cohort 
(for which the reform changes will be already fully implemented) are taken from estimations by 
Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) who explicitly model the behavioural effects of this reform. For the 
1941 to 1943 cohorts that are directly affected by the phase-in of the new regulations, the respective 
probability values were derived by linear interpolation of the pre- and post-reform probabilities. In 
addition, the probabilities account for the fact that women can no longer receive their old-age pension 
at the age of 60 with their earliest possibility now being age 63 if they have an earnings history of at 
least 35 years.30 Probabilities after age 62 are zero since it is assumed that old-age retirement turns 
more favourable then. 
 
 
Note that introducing the probability of invalidity under the current assumptions 
affects both the contribution and the pension phase.31 Also, while OldAge
acP +  and 
Contribc,a are here equivalent to Pc,a and Contribc,a from section 3.2, the calculation 
of Disab
acP +  is more complex. For a given disability retirement age, the size of the 
disability pension can easily be derived from the sum of earning points that was 
collected over the previous working life, additional earning points that take into 
account the remaining years until the age of 60 and are granted in the case of 
                                                 
30 In fact, individuals with an earnings history of at least 35 years of cohorts after 1950 can claim their 
old-age pensions already at age 62 – but only with the respective reductions of their benefits by 
10.8%, which is why they are not likely to do so. 
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disability, an adjustment factor Fc+a,,Disab corresponding to the one for early 
retirement and the current pension value. However, in this stochastic approach, each 
possible disability retirement age applies with a certain probability pc,a(DisabEntry). 
All potential possibilities of disability retirement entry in and before age a therefore 
have to be considered in the calculation of Disab
acP , : 
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 pc,a(DisabEntry) … Probability to become disabled at age a 
 Fc+a,Disab  … Adjustment factor in case of disability at time t=c+a 
 pc,i(DisabEntry) … Probability to become disabled at any age i before age a 
 Fc+i,Disab  … Adjustment factor in case of disability at any age i before age a 
 
Step 3: Introducing a stochastic retirement age.   So far, it was assumed that the 
individual retires at the statutory retirement age of 65 unless he/she becomes disabled 
before that age (or chooses to retire according to the disability option). However, as 
Figure 5 showed, people may retire before age 65 also because of other early 
retirement options. Figure 6 depicts these probabilities of old-age-retirement for men 
and women of selected cohorts. Again, it is assumed that cohorts before 1938 and 
1939 respectively retire with the same probability as the 1938 cohort. The same 
applies to all cohorts after 1945 and 1946 with respect to the 1945/ 1946 cohort. 
Probabilities turn positive at age 63 for (longtime insured) men and at age 60 for 
women of older cohorts. Note that the increase in the retirement age for women of 
younger cohorts eventually also leads to probabilities of old-age retirement of zero 
until age 63 as it is the case for men. 
                                                                                                                                          
31 Recall that for now the pension phase is still assumed to start at age 65. This assumption will be 
changed in the next step. 
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FIGURE 6: CHANGES IN OLD-AGE-RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR (COHORT 1938 TO 
1946) 
Source: Probabilities for the 1938 and 1939 cohorts (that were not affected by the reforms) and for the 
1945 and 1946 cohort (for which the reform changes will be fully implemented) are again taken from 
estimations by Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004). For the 1940 to 1944 cohorts that are directly 
affected by the phase-in of the new regulations, the respective probability values were again derived 
by linear interpolation of the pre- and post-reform probabilities. 
 
The strict confinement of contribution and pension phase pursued above is therefore 
no longer possible. Equation 3.9 demonstrates how probabilities of invalidity and 
retirement entry are included in our rate of return calculations: 
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 pc,a (OldAge) … Probability of cohort c to be retired at age a 
        Note: pc,72(Disab)+ pc,72(OldAge)=1 
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While the calculation of Disab
acP ,  and Contribc,a remains unchanged, 
OldAge
acP ,  now is 
determined similarly to Disab
acP , : 
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Fi,OldAge    … Adjustment factor in case of old-age retirement32 at age i 
 
The case of married couples.   For the reason of simplicity, the above equations 
solely referred to the demographic group of single men or women. For married men 
the probability of their spouse’s survival after their death has to be taken into account 
– as it was already shown for the deterministic approach. Adding this probability to 
the above equations gives us equation 11: 
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 Sc,Spouse  … Survival probability of the spouse 
 Surv
acP ,   … Survivor pension the spouse of cohort c receives at age a 
 
Surv
acP ,  is calculated according to the same concept applied for 
Disab
acP ,  and 
OldAge
acP ,  
above. The size of the survivor pension is determined as 60% of the old-age pension 
in the case of death after old-age retirement and as 60% of the respective disability 
pension in the case of death before old-age retirement. 
                                                 
32 Recall that the adjustment factor is equal to 1 if the individual retires at the statutory retirement age. 
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4 Calculation results 
What are the results of the two approaches and in what respect do they differ? This 
question will be answered in this section. All calculations are based on the past and 
projected development as depicted in Figure 1 to Figure 6 above. The results of the 
deterministic approach will be shown first. Taking these as a starting point, the 
deterministic basic scenario is again extended in three consecutive steps by selected 
features of the stochastic approach in order to demonstrate the different impacts the 
two approaches have on the resulting rates of return. Finally, the overall results of the 
stochastic approach are compared to the deterministic outcomes from the beginning 
of the section. 
4.1 Results from the deterministic approach 
Since we used the same methodology as Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) in our realization 
of the deterministic approach, the results for the nominal rates of return are quite 
similar to those calculated by Ohsmann & Stolz (2004). Resulting real rates also 
roughly correspond to those calculated by Sozialbeirat (2004). 
The Standard Pensioner.   Table 2 summarizes the results for the standard 
pensioner and compares them to the results by Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) and 
Sozialbeirat (2004). Recall that the demographic groups here only differ with regard 
to their remaining life expectancies at retirement entry (age 65) and thus the length of 
their pension phases, while the contribution phases of all three groups are identical. 
Hence, single women record higher rates of return than single men (roughly 0.6 
percentage points) thanks to their higher life expectancy. Likewise, married men 
record the highest rates of return of all three demographic groups because of their 
three-year younger wife (recall the assumptions) whose life expectancy obviously is 
higher than that of women of the same cohort as the man. Note that the three-years 
difference is just sufficient in order to compensate for the reduced pension benefits in 
form of the widow pension. 
 
Cohort  Single, male Single, female Married, male 
  Ohsmann & 
Stolz (2004) 
Sozialbeirat 
(2004) 
Author’s 
calculations 
Ohsmann & 
Stolz (2004) 
Sozialbeirat 
(2004) 
Author’s 
calculations 
Ohsmann & 
Stolz (2004) 
Sozialbeirat 
(2004) 
Author’s 
calculations 
Nom. 3,96 % 4,01 % 4,19 % 4,62 % --- 4,79 % 4,71 % --- 4,81 % 1939 
Real --- 1,75 % 1,90 % --- --- 2,50 % --- --- 2,53 % 
Nom. --- --- 3,99 % --- --- 4,60 % --- --- 4,66 % 1940 
Real --- --- 1,74 % --- --- 2,35 % --- --- 2,41 % 
Nom. --- 3,59 % 3,70 % --- 4,19 % 4,29 % --- 4,09 % 4,34 % 1944 
Real --- 1,56 % 1,62 % --- 2,14 % 2,20 % --- 2,05 % 2,25 % 
Nom. 3,00 % --- 2,89 % 3,60 % --- 3,51 % --- --- 3,53 % 1975 
Real --- --- 1,36 % --- --- 1,97 % --- --- 1,99 % 
Nom. --- --- 2,87 % --- --- 3,49 % --- --- 3,50 % 1980 
Real --- --- 1,35 % --- --- 1,96 % --- --- 1,97 % 
TABLE 2: RATES OF RETURN FOR SELECTED COHORTS ACCORDING TO THE DETERMINISTIC APPROACH 
Notes: Deviations between the author’s calculations and Ohsmann & Stolz (2004) and Sozialbeirat (2004) are mainly due to differences in the underlying projections. Whereas Ohsmann & Stolz 
(2004) refer to separate external demographic, labour market and pension system forecasts, our calculations are based on a set of consistent projections computed by the MEA pension simulation 
program MEA-PENSIM.33 The underlying demographic and labour market assumptions for these projections correspond to those used by the “Rürup Commission” (Kommission für die 
Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme, 2003) while assumptions about the pension system reflect the status quo. Health care contributions by the pension insurance are 
not included in the calculation. If they were this would lead to an increase of the rates of return by roughly 0.25 percentage points. 
 
                                                 
33 See Wilke (2004) for a detailed description of the program. 
Across cohorts, it can be seen that the rates of return for the younger 1980 cohort 
turn out lower than those for the 1940 cohort (about 1.1 percentage points in nominal 
and 0.4 percentage points in real terms). This result is not surprising taking into 
consideration the development of contribution rates and pension level depicted in 
Figure 1. Note that also the 1940 cohort is affected by this, since the projected 
decline in pension levels already fully affects their pension phase. 
However, the decline in the rates of return cannot completely be attributed to the 
demographic burden and its future negative effects on contribution rates and pension 
levels. The rates of return for today’s retiring cohorts are also higher thanks to the 
relatively low contribution rates of 14% until 196734 that lead to comparably low 
contribution payments during this period. The sheer development of contribution 
rates in the past35 already induces a decline in the rates of return of those cohorts that 
have entered the labour force at later points in time. In fact, compared to today’s 
older pensioner cohorts, already today’s retiring cohorts record lower rates of return 
since their contribution history also comprises the past 20 years where higher 
contribution rates around 18% were the case. 
Thus, the trend of a decline in the rates of return is not new and can already be 
observed today – both due to the past institutional and projected future demographic 
development of the system. However, while for the past the decline in the rates of 
return can be ascribed solely to the development of the contribution rate, future rates 
of return will be affected by both the development of contribution rates and that of 
pension levels. For the 1940 to 1980 cohorts the resulting trend is depicted in Figure 
7. 
                                                 
34 Only in 1973 did the contribution rate reach the 18% mark (recall FIGURE 1). Until the mid 1950s 
the contribution rate even was below 14%, at 10% and 11%. 
35 Note that, in contrast to the projected future rise of the contribution rate that can be attributed to 
demographic reasons, rises in the 1970s and 1980s mainly allowed an increasing generosity of the 
system. 
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FIGURE 7: RATES OF RETURN OVER TIME ACCORDING TO THE DETERMINISTIC 
APPROACH 
 
Figure 6 as well as Figure 7 also point up the difference between nominal and real 
rates of return. While nominal rates turn out considerably higher for the cohorts of 
the 1940s due to high and strongly fluctuating inflation particularly in the 1970s, 
their distance to the real rates reaches a stable 1.5 percentage points for cohorts from 
1965 on when the largest part of the contribution phase is solely based on projected 
wage development. However, note that rates of return clearly remain positive under 
both terms. 
Early retirement.   In the case of early retirement, the rates of return turn out only 
slightly higher than for the standard pensioner which is mainly due to the adjustment 
factors.36 This result corresponds to the findings by Sozialbeirat (2004) and shall not 
be evaluated further here. Note that it is crucial for the analysis to compare 
pensioners of the same cohort.37 
                                                 
36 See Stolz and Thiede (2003) for a justification of the sizes of the adjustment factors. 
37 Ohsmann & Stolz (2004) e.g. choose to present their scenario results for different cohorts. 
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4.2 Results from the stochastic approach 
Similar to our proceedings in section 3.3 we will analyse the results from the 
stochastic approach in three consecutive steps. Table 3 gives an overview of which 
parameters are introduced deterministically and stochastically in which steps. 
 
 Life length Disability Retirement Age 
a) stochastic 
 contributions38 
Step 1 
b) stochastic 
    benefits39 
 c) total effect 
deterministic deterministic 
Step 2 stochastic stochastic deterministic 
Step3 stochastic stochastic stochastic 
TABLE 3: STEP-WISE ANALYSIS OF THE STOCHASTIC APPROACH – CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
Step1: Introducing probabilities of survival.   In a first step, the life expectancy 
data used in the deterministic approach is replaced by the respective survival 
probabilities. In what way this affects the size of the payment flow is depicted in 
Figure 8 for the contribution and the pension phase respectively.40 
For the contribution phase (Step 1a), contributions are slightly lower as compared 
to the deterministic approach because there is a probability that contributors die 
before reaching the normal retirement age. Around age 50, contribution payments are 
more than 5%, around age 60 already more than 10% lower than the contribution 
payments recorded under the deterministic approach.41 
For the pension phase (Step 1b), Figure 8 depicts a totally different picture. Under 
the scenario-based approach, survival until the remaining life expectancy age 81,5 is 
sure and benefits increase according to real wage adjustment. After age 81,5, benefits 
are zero. In the stochastic approach, however, expected benefits decline steadily 
because the probabilities of survival decrease faster than the wage adjustment.42 
                                                 
38 Accounting separately for the first bias that does not account for possible death before age 65. 
39 Accounting separately for the second bias that results from neglecting Jensen’s inequality. 
40 Note that the only difference between the two payment flows shown in Figure 8 lies in the use of 
the remaining life expectancy and survival probability respectively. In particular, this means that 
contribution payments are only considered with 80% according to the usual practices common for the 
deterministic approach. The contribution correction factor will be introduced in step 2. 
41 Figure 8 is based on real values for 2004. 
42 For data reasons, the maximum age for the calculations presented in this paper is assumed to be 100 
years. 
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FIGURE 8: INTRODUCING PROBABILITIES OF SURVIVAL – CONTRIBUTION AND 
PENSION PHASE OF A SINGLE MAN OF THE 1940 COHORT 
 
Which impact do these two effects now have on the resulting rates of return? 
Figure 9 shows the resulting real internal rates of return for the 1940 cohort for all 
three demographic groups. The effects on the contribution phase (Step 1a) and on the 
pension phase (Step 1b) are illustrated separately before the combined effect of both 
effects is shown as Step 1c. 
It can be seen that the internal rates of return turn out higher if the probability of 
death before retirement is taken into account (Step 1a) since expected contribution 
payments are lower. On the other hand, internal rates of return are lower if remaining 
life expectancies are replaced by survival probabilities (Step 1b) due to the concave 
survival probability function and Jensen’s inequality as it was explained at the end of 
section 3.2. The overall effect (Step 1c) is a decrease in the rates of return. For 
women, whose survival probabilities are clearly higher than those of men (recall 
Figure 4) the effects are considerably smaller than for single men. 
 27
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
Men, s ingle Wom en, s ingle Men, m arried
In
te
rn
al
 ra
te
 o
f r
et
ur
n 
(r
ea
l) 
Deterministic Approach
Step 1a: Effect on Contributions
Step 1b: Effect on Benefits
Step 1c: Total Effect
 
FIGURE 9: INTRODUCING PROBABILITIES OF SURVIVAL – RATES OF RETURN 
FOR THE 1940 COHORT 
 
Married men are the only group recording higher rates of return. This is due to 
two effects. On the one hand, there is already a positive probability of death and 
survival of the spouse before retirement (recall section 3.3) which is not taken into 
account under the deterministic approach and which has a positive effect on the rate 
of return. On the other hand, this probability rises with age which means that 
according to Jensen’s inequality the true rate of return is underestimated in the case 
the remaining life expectancy and a subsequent survivor pension are assumed as it is 
done under the deterministic approach. Figure 10 illustrates these effects on the 
overall payment flow. 
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FIGURE 10: INTRODUCING PROBABILITIES OF SURVIVAL – CONTRIBUTION AND 
PENSION PHASE OF A MARRIED MAN OF THE 1940 COHORT 
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Step 2: Introducing probabilities of disability.   As it was explained in section 3.2, 
the deterministic approach does not include benefits from disability pensions but 
instead uses a contribution correction factor that reduces the applicable contribution 
payment size by the percentage that is assumed to finance the invalidity risk. 
In Step 2 we now explicitly consider disability risk under the stochastic approach. 
We abandon the contribution correction factor and introduce probabilities of 
disability instead. Since the pool of pensioners for a specific cohort remains 
unchanged, this means that less people retire at the statutory retirement age of 65 but 
retire earlier due to disability. They thus receive lower pensions, but for a longer time 
period.43 The net effect is negative. As Figure 11 shows, resulting rates of return for 
Step 2 are lower than for Step 1. 
However, a second effect counteracts this first one. The higher the probability of 
disability for younger ages near age 54, the higher the weight of these potential 
pension benefits for the remaining payment flow calculation, since for each 
subsequent age the potential benefit flow from an earlier claimed disability pension 
is considered. For this reason, the decline in the resulting rates of return turns out 
highest for single women. As could be seen from Table 1 and Figure 6, women of the 
1940 cohort have a much lower probability to retire before age 60 than men. 
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FIGURE 11: INTRODUCING PROBABILITIES OF DISABILITY – RATES OF RETURN 
FOR THE 1940 COHORT 
                                                 
43 It is likely that those people receiving a disability pension in general have a lower life expectancy 
than healthy people that work until the statutory retirement age. Since data on this feedback effects is 
not readily available, this aspect is neglected here. 
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The effect of the change in retirement behaviour can also be shown nicely for single 
men. Figure 12 compares the effects for the 1940 and 1980 cohort. It can be seen that 
the size of potential disability pension flows clearly diminishes from about two thirds 
for the 1940 to one third of the overall pension flow for the 1980 cohort, as was to be 
expected from the assumptions made above. 
 
-6.000 €
-4.000 €
-2.000 €
0 €
2.000 €
4.000 €
6.000 €
8.000 €
10.000 €
12.000 €
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age
A
nn
ua
l r
ea
l c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
an
d 
pe
ns
io
n 
pa
ym
en
ts
 (M
al
e,
 s
in
gl
e,
 c
oh
or
t 1
94
0)
Contribution Paym ents Disability Pens ion Old-Age Pens ion
 
-15.000 €
-10.000 €
-5.000 €
0 €
5.000 €
10.000 €
15.000 €
20.000 €
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age
A
nn
ua
l r
ea
l c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
an
d 
pe
ns
io
n 
pa
ym
en
ts
 (M
al
e,
 s
in
gl
e,
 c
oh
or
t 1
98
0)
Contribution Paym ents Disability Pens ion Old-Age Pens ion
 
FIGURE 12: INTRODUCING PROBABILITIES OF DISABILITY – CONTRIBUTION AND 
PENSION PHASE OF A SINGLE MALE FOR THE 1940 AND 1980 COHORTS 
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Step 3: Introducing a stochastic retirement age.   In contrast to the deterministic 
approach, the stochastic approach allows taking into account all potentially possible 
early, normal and late retirement scenarios. Step 3 replaces the statutory, fixed 
retirement age by a flexible one based on the old-age retirement probabilities 
displayed in Figure 6. The results are shown in Figure 13. Note that a positive old-
age pension flow for ages below the statutory retirement age of 65 is now recorded. 
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FIGURE 13: INTRODUCING A STOCHASTIC RETIREMENT AGE – CONTRIBUTION 
AND PENSION PHASE FOR A MARRIED MAN OF THE 1940 COHORT 
 
The effect of the introduction of the stochastic retirement age on the resulting rates of 
return is shown in Figure 14 for the 1940 and 1980 cohort. While the effect is 
positive for the 1940 cohort across all demographic groups, the results from Step 2 
remain almost unchanged for the 1980 cohort. This result nicely demonstrates the 
effects of the introduction of adjustment factors for early retirement with the 1992 
and 1999 German pension reforms and also shows that these adjustment factors are 
indeed roughly actuarially neutral. The slight decrease in the rates of return 
(compared to Step 2) for single men and women of the 1980 cohort indicates that the 
concept of adjustment factors probably also goes back to a deterministic approach 
based on remaining life expectancy figures and that once survival probabilities are 
applied this actuarial fairness no longer fully holds. As could be seen from Step1, the 
introduction of survival probabilities leads to a negative effect on the rates of return. 
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FIGURE 14: INTRODUCING A STOCHASTIC RETIREMENT AGE – RATES OF 
RETURN FOR THE 1940 AND 1980 COHORT 
 
 32 
4.3 The stochastic versus the deterministic approach 
The previous three steps transformed the deterministic approach into a stochastic 
one. A summary of the results of the two approaches for both the 1940 and 1980 
cohort is given in Table 4.44 Across demographic groups, it can be seen that both for 
single men and for single women rates of return turn out lower under the stochastic 
approach. In contrast, rates of return for married men turn out slightly higher for the 
1940 and slightly lower for the 1980 cohort than under the deterministic approach. 
Across cohorts, both approaches deliver very similar results for the 1940 cohort that 
hardly differ by more than 0.2 percentage points. However, projections for younger 
cohorts like the 1980 cohort turn out considerably different under the two 
approaches. The results here differ by 0.5 to about 0.7 percentage points. 
 
 Cohort 1940 Cohort 1980 
 Nominal Real Nominal Real 
 Det. Stoch. Det. Stoch. Det. Stoch. Det. Stoch. 
Single, 
male 
3,99% 3,83% 1,74% 1,54% 2,87% 2,12% 1,35% 0,61% 
Single, 
female 
4,60% 4,40% 2,35% 2,12% 3,49% 2,95% 1,96% 1,41% 
Married, 
male 
4,66% 4,79% 2,41% 2,49% 3,50% 2,91% 1,97% 1,47% 
TABLE 4: RATES OF RETURN FOR THE 1940 AND 1980 COHORT ACCORDING TO 
THE DETERMINISTIC AND THE STOCHASTIC APPROACH 
 
This outcome shows that for today’s retiring cohorts the differences between the 
two approaches in the end are surprisingly small, given the partly significant 
differences that could be seen during the step-wise transformation above. However, 
the fact that the results vary significantly for younger cohorts calls into mind that 
both approaches are based on very different concepts and assumptions that react very 
differently to longer life spans and different retirement behaviour of future cohorts. 
Still, rates of return remain positive under both approaches. Calculations for even 
younger cohorts show no further considerable changes in the rates of return if the 
demographic and labour market develops according to the projections. 
                                                 
44 The highlighted columns 5 and 9 in TABLE 4 are identical to the fourth bar (“Step 3”) in FIGURE 
14. 
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5 Conclusions and outlook 
The calculations presented in this paper show that under realistic assumptions of 
future demographic and labour market development, rates of return of the German 
public pension system will indeed decline in the future but they will remain positive. 
In contrast to the deterministic scenario-based approach typically applied in the 
German pension literature, this paper proposes a stochastic approach that allows to 
consider the entire range of possible scenarios simultaneously instead of restricting 
the analysis to one selected scenario at a time. Hence, all risks covered by the 
German pension insurance – including the invalidity risk – can be adequately 
captured in the rate of return calculations, which is not possible using the 
deterministic, scenario-based approach. 
Furthermore, the stochastic approach corrects for a serious mistake of the 
scenario-based approach. In taking the remaining life expectancy at age 65 as the 
determinant of the length of the pension period, the deterministic approach makes 
two implicit assumptions: (1) that the respective individual with certainty reaches age 
65 and (2) that he/she, again with certainty, continues to live according to the 
respective average remaining life expectancy of the cohort. It was shown that these 
two assumptions create a considerable bias, overestimating the rates of return. If age- 
and cohort-specific survival probabilities are taken into account in the stochastic 
approach, rates of return turn out substantially lower. The effect is weaker for women 
than for men since women have considerably higher survival probabilities for ages 
over 65 and therefore can better compensate the first effect of a possible death before 
retirement. 
Future nominal rates of return are of course much higher than the real rates. The 
results show that they will clearly stay above 2% for all demographic groups. Since 
the juridical debate refers to nominal rates of return, the future constitutionality of 
the German public pension system seems to be warranted as long as no further 
demographic or labour market shocks occur. 
While the stochastic approach presented in this paper allows for a more precise 
calculation of the size of future rates of returns, its application requires appropriate 
data on the respective survival and retirement probabilities. This is not so much a 
problem concerning the age- and cohort-specific survival probabilities as concerning 
the probabilities of retirement entry. For the calculations in this paper, this data was 
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available thanks to the estimation of these probabilities by Berkel and Börsch-Supan 
(2003) that adequately reflects projected future changes in response to the recent 
reform measures in this area. If such data is not available, a stochastic computation 
that adequately considers all risks is no longer possible. However, as a first step 
towards a more proper computation of cohort-specific rates of return, the 
introduction of age- and cohort-specific survival probabilities into an otherwise 
scenario-based approach could at least correct for the two mistakes named above and 
is thus strongly recommended by the author. 
 35
Appendix 
A. Some notes on life expectancy, survival rates and 
rates of return 
It was pointed out in section 3.2 that under the scenario-based approach the use of 
the remaining life expectancy in order to determine the relevant retirement period 
leads to two severe biases: (1) the possible event of death before retirement is 
neglected and (2) the remaining life expectancy of the cohort is assumed to 
adequately reflect the “typical, average” pensioner of that cohort. In the following, it 
is explained in more detail why resulting rates of return turn out higher if these two 
biases persist. 
Figure 15 shows how the contribution and pension phase look like if remaining 
life expectancies or survival probabilities are applied (recall Figure 8). The question 
is why rates of return turn out differently under these two approaches. 
 
Benefits
Contributions
Age
aRLE AaREa0
area B
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rectangle C
rectangle A
 
FIGURE 15: CONTRIBUTION AND PENSION PHASE FOR CALCULATIONS BASED ON THE REMAINING 
LIFE EXPECTANCY AND CALCULATIONS BASED ON SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES 
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The rates of return are derived from the proportion of the size of benefits to the 
size of contributions as represented by the two rectangles and areas in Figure 15. 
However, due to the compound interest effects, this relationship is not linear. Even if 
the rectangles and areas in Figure 15 were of equivalent size, the resulting rates of 
return in all but one case would still differ. 
The following stylized example shows in what respect the rates of return 
calculations differ for the two approaches. Assume an annual net payment flow of -1 
and plus 1 for the contribution and pension phase respectively. Using the remaining 
life expectancy, the rate of return r is derived by solving equation A1: 
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The age of the remaining life expectancy aRLE is thereby determined as follows: 
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The survival rate S(a|aRE=65) determines the probability to reach age a given that the 
age aRE =65 was reached. S(a) represents the conditional survival rate to survive at a 
certain age while M(a) represents the mortality rate to die from one year to the next. 
In contrast, when survival probabilities are used, the rate of return r is to be 
derived from equation A3. Note that the probability pa is equivalent to the survival 
rate S(a|a0=20) and is now placed in the sum instead of determining the final sum 
index. 
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Apart from the fact that A1 relies on S(a|aRE=65) whereas A3 relies on S(a|a0=20) 
which alone obviously would lead to higher rates of return for the first approach, the 
introduction of the survival rates once as the final running index of the sum and once 
as a part of the sum will in general not lead to identical results. 
B. Some notes on rates of return based on expected 
payments flows and expected rates of return 
Section 3.3 presented a stochastic approach where the rate of return is calculated on 
the basis of the expected payment flow in order to consider all risks that are covered 
by the German pension insurance simultaneously. Alternatively, one might want to 
calculate the expected rate of return E(r) as it is known from the finance literature. In 
this case, the rate of return rn is computed for each possible scenario n of a cohort c: 
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 n  … Scenario index with N=maximum number of possible scenarios 
 aRE,n  … Age of retirement entry in scenario n 
 Ac,n  … Maximum age/ end of pension period in scenario n 
 Pc,a,n  … Pension payments to cohort c at age a in scenario n 
 rn  … Internal rate of return for scenario n 
 Contribc,a,n … Contribution payments by cohort c at age a in scenario n 
 
These scenario-specific rates of return rn are then weighted according to their 
probability pn to occur: 
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 pn  … Probability of scenario n to occur 
 pa,i  … Probability of the event i to occur at age a as assumed 
         in scenario n (e.g. old-age retirement at age 65)45 
 i  … Index of possible events (working, receiving a certain 
         pension type, death, survivor pensions) with 
         I=maximum  number of possible events at age a 
 
This expected rate of return method, however, has a drawback. For each case 
where a person dies before retirement the respective scenario-specific rate of return 
amounts to -100%, since this person receives no benefits at all. This amount enters 
into the calculation weighted with the respective probability of death at that age and 
has a large negative impact on the overall expected rate of return. Figure 16 
illustrates this point. It depicts the scenario-specific rates of return for the case of a 
                                                 
45 Note that the respective probabilities will be explained in more detail later in this section. 
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standard pensioner who – if surviving – retires at age 65. Figure 16 displays the rate 
of return by time of death. 
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FIGURE 16: SCENARIO-SPECIFIC RATES OF RETURN FOR RETIREMENT AT AGE 6546 
 
Although the scenario-specific rates of return eventually turn positive for ages above 
75, they are not sufficiently large in order to make up for the extremely negative 
rates until age 65. Weighted with their probabilities to occur and accounting for all 
possible scenarios including disability, early retirement and survivor pensions, the 
scenario-specific rates of return lead to a highly negative expected rate of return E(r). 
Calculations show that the latter amounts to about –28% for the 1940 and about –
22% for the 1980 cohort.47 
                                                 
46 Figures are based on calculations for the 1940 cohort. 
47 Note that the expected rate of return for the 1980 cohort is lower since it records considerably lower 
probabilities of death for younger ages (recall Figure 4). 
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